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There probably is  -so  that the benefits of an increase  in
household well-being need not fully "trickle down" to the most
disadvantaged members of the household  - particularly in the
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Is there a "Kuznets curve" for intra-household  being need not fully "trickle down" to the most
inequality?  Does intra-household inequality first  disadvantaged members of the household.  This
increase, peak, and then decrease as the house-  is palticularly true for the poorest households.
hold becomes better off?
This finding should be taken into account in
Haddad and Kanbur found both theoretical  the design of supplementary feeding programs,
and tentative empirical support for this hypoth-  for example.  Research is now under way on this
esis.  topic.
The policy significance of this finding is that
the benefits of an increase in household well-
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1. Xntroduction
The notion of a link between inequality and avorage  well-being at the
level of an economy was first introduced by Kuznets (19SS).  Relying
on long-run historical data, and on a model of the development
process, Ku:nets hypothesised what has now become known as the
"Xnverse-U" relationship: as average well-being increases, inequality
within a nation first increases, reaches a peak, and then decreases.
A vast literature has grown up around this topic and there have been
many attempts to test the relationship for data on currently
developing countries (see  Ahluwalia, 1976, Anand and Kanbur, 1990).
The Kuznets relationship  was hypothesised for inequality in the
economy as a whole. In recent years, however, much has been written
about inequality within a household. As evidence on patterns of
intra-household allocation has mounted  (see  Sen, 1984; Harriss, 1986:
Deaton, 1989; Behrman, 1990) it has been recognised that an increase
in the average well being of a household need not necessarily feed
through uniformly to all members of that household. This raises the
issue of what does happen to intra-household distribution of well-
being when the household as a whole gets better off. It also raises
the intriguing question: Might there exist a Kuznets-type inverse-U
curve for intra-household inequality?
The question is indeed intriguing, and curiosity might well be
sufficient reason for investigating it further. However, the
investigation is in principle also relevant to the design of poverty
alleviation policies. Is the best way of helping poor individuals to
help poor households? Put another way, if we ensure an increase in3
the total consumption of poor households, are we in fact also
ensuring an increase in the consumption of the most disadvantaged
members of society? These will be recognised as being the micro-
counterparts to questions on the "trickle-down" hypothesis at the
macro level. But now there is a sharper policy issue.  Targeting to
individual, disadvantaged members of a household  may be extremely
difficult and costly. Are these costs worth paying? The answer
depends on whether household level benefits do indeed "trickle down"
to the individual level. Hence the importance of the intriguing
question of what happens to intra-household distribution when the
household as a whole  becomes better off.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the
theoretical  arguments for the possible existence of an intra-
household Kuznets-curve. We find theoretical support for  the possible
existence of the relationship. Section 3 then moves to an empirical
investigation,  with an attempt to look for the relationship in a data
set on nutritional intake in the Philippines. Section 4 concludes the
paper by indicating areas for further research.
2. Theoretical  Arguments for the Inverse-V
Much of the literature on intrahousehold allocation has proceeded in
the framework of household welfare maximisation (see  for example Pitt
and Rosenzweig, 1985 and Behrman, 1988a, 1988b). Let the household
welfare function be given by
(1)  W - W(X1, LI,  x2 ,  L2 . .,,  xn  Ln)4
where xl is a vector of consumption by the ith individual, and Li is
labour supply. If we suppose that labour supplied is itself a
function of consumption 1 ,  the household's problem becomes
(2)  Max W
n.  n.
s.t. pX £x1 - ZwiLi(X
i 1  i-1
where px is the is the price vector for x, and wi is the wage rate
for individual i.
The solution to (2)  determines the i..rahousehold  allocation, but
dois not, at this level of generality, generate useful insights on
the relationship  between intrahousehold inequality and average
household well-being. Stiglitz (1976)  specialised equation (2) into a
form that could yield such insights. Let there be a single good, no
labour supply term in the welfare function, and let Li(x) be
identical for all i. If we further simplify to a separable
Utilitarian welfare function for a "family farm" household with two
identical members, the problem in (2)  becomes
(3)  Max U(xl) + U(x2)
9.t. xi + x2 - G(L(x 1 ) + L(x2); 0)
where U(.) is an increasing  concave function, G(.,0) is the family
farm's  production function, and 0  is a parameter representing labour
productivity; Go > 0.
1  Some evidence of this is presented in Haddad and Bouis (1989).5
Stiglitz's (1976)  analysis is based on a shape for the L(x)  curve
that has an increasing returns  portion, as is common in the
"efficiency wage" models. This is shown in figure 1. On this figure,
x  is the efficiency consumption - that which maximises labour supply
per unit of consumption. If the value of 0 was 0*,  such that
(4) x* +  x* - G(L(x*) +  L(x*); 0")
then  clearly  (x  ,x*) is  the  solution  to  problem  (3).  In  other  words,
for  the  household  for  which  B - 0e,  there  will  always  be  equality.
However, when 0  <  9* the  housihold  is  operating  in  the  convex
portion  of  the  L(x)  curve.  Now  there  is a tradeoff between equality
in  consumption  and  the  total  level  of  labour  supply  - s-ince  more  can
be generated by disequalising consumption. For 0 a  0*,  the  household
is in the concave portion of the L(x) curve, so that disequalising
consumption will not increase total labour supply. Thus equality
preference in the concave shape of V(.) will dominate and we will
continue to have equality.
We set then that for 0 2 0*  there  is  equality,  while  for  0  <  0"  there
may be inequality. These results are established formally by Stiglitz
(1976).  Another case he considers is where B is so low that the
marginal product of labour is zero.  In this case, even though
creation  of  consumption  inequality  may  lead  to  greater  labour  supply,
this  does  not bring about any increase in total output, so the
household  prefers  equality.  Stiglitz  (1976)  summarizes  the  results  as
follows:6




"In effect, when the economy is very well off, there is no trade-off
between efficiency and equity, so maximisation of family welfare
involves complete equality... On the other hand, when the economy is
very poor,  .e...., the marginal productivity of labour services is
zero: then of course again there is no tradcoff between equity and
efficiency" (Stiglitz, 1976).
In between these extremes we find inequality.  What has just  been
described is, of cour.ae,  none other than an inverse U-shape!
A number of writers have eschewed the common  preference, household
welfare maximisation approach to intrahousehold resource allocation,9
and have instead emphasised individual preferences, conflict, and
bargaining among household members (Manser  and Brown, 1980; McIlroy
and Horney, 1978; Folbre, 1984, 1986).  While some have pointed to the
difficulties in distinguishing empirically  between the two types of
models  (Thomas, 1989; Senauer et. al. 1988),  there nevertheless
appears to be good reason why a more conflictual approach to
intrahousehold allocation should  at least be investigated (how  else,
for example, do we explain the observation that consumption patterns
within a household depend on who earns what income?). Within the
framework of two-person cooperative and non-cooperative bargaining
theory, Haddad and Kanbur  (1990a)  have investigated the relationship
between  intra-household  inequality  and  various  types  of  it  :ovement
in  average  household  well-being.  While  no  general  conclus;.ons  can  be
drawn  (as  in  the  case  of  household  welfare  maximisation  model,) they
do show that under certain conditions bargaining models also  predict
an inve-se-U relationship between intrahousehold inequality and
average household well-being, as the result  of li  teractions  between
the effects of increases in the total resources  being bargained over,
and changes in bargaining strengths.8
Theoretical  argument does  seem then,  to present  a prima  facie  case  in
favour of a  Kuznets-type  Inverse-U  hypothesis  foc  intra-household
inequality.  The task of the next  section is to investigate  its
existence  in the context  of a particular  dataset.
3.  Evidence  from  the  Philippines
3.1  The  data  and  variables
This  section uses  survey data  from the Philippines  in an attempt  to
verify  the existence  of an inverted  U-shape between intrahousehold
inequality  and average household  well-being.  Our measure  of well
being is calorie adequacy,  which has been  used and discussed  in the
literature.
The data  are from a four-round  stratified  random survey of the
predominantly  rural southern  Philippine  province of Bukidnon.  The
survey was conducted  over  a sixteen mont-.  period  in 1984-85 and
investigates,  among other  things, the dietary  intakes of 448
households,  covering  2880 individuals  (excluding those who are
breastfeeding) 2 . Calorie  adequacy  is defined as calorie intake
divided by calorie requirement.  The following  sub-sections  take up a
number  of  details regarding  the construction  of variables  of
interest.
2  For a much  fuller account  of the data  set context, collection,
and content see Bouis and Haddad  (Forthcoming).9
3.1.1  Measurement  of  energy  intake
We use calorie  intakes  as calculated  from  24  hour recalls  by the
mothe.,  of food  eaten by individual  household  m_mbers.  This
information  will  be subject  to a number  of biases  and intraindividual
variation.  The biases  due to 24 hour  intakes  are  well-known  (USDA
1986a)  and  in an attempt  to mi. _-ise the net  effect  of biases  and
make  the dietary  snapshot  more typical,  we use  only  four-round
average  recalls:  a technique  used for  a number  of  years by the  USDA
for its  National  Food Consumption  Surveys (USDA  1986b)  and also  by
Behrman (1988a,  1988b).3
3.1.2  Measurement  of energy  requirement
It  is not so  much intra  as interindividual  variation  that is the  main
problem  in  measuring  individual  energy  requirement3.  Consider  a group
from  a healthy  population,  with  the same  age,  gender,  weight,
pregnancy/lactation  status,  in the same  climate,  with  the same
pattern  and  intensity  of time use:  interindividual  variation  in
metabolic  efficiency  would lead  to a normal  distribution  of energy
requirements,  even within  this  group.  3  mean  of this  distribution
3  The  position  with respect  to the 24  hour recall  method is sunmmed
up by Chavez  and  Huenemann (in  Sahn  et. al. 1984):  "One  day may not
represent  a typical  intake  for  the individual  household.  Twenty-four
hour  intakes  of a large sample  of households  may, however,  represent
a typical  daily  intake for  the community  as  a whole".  Since  total
variation  in individual  energy  intake  can  be represented  as
V(interindividual)  +  V(intraindividual)/n,  we seek  to minimise  the
intraindiv_dual  component  by by averaging  across  four  rounds  of
intake  data (n  - 4) for  each individual.  For  each individual,  each
observation  is independent,  therefore  we are  able to reduce
considerably  the intraindividual  component.  Representativeness  is
further  enhanced  as data collection  takes  place  acros*s  season  and day
of the week.10
would  be called  the  energy 'requirement'  of an individual  from this
group. If  the  mean of the  individual  calorie  intake/the  group's
energy requirement  standard  turned  out  to be 1.0,  then  half  of the
group  would  be classified  as undernourished,  although  if the group
were  defined  as homogeneously  as possible  with respect  to requirement
the  depth  of undernutrition  would be  minimised.  Indeed,  if  the
variance  of  requirements  for  age-sex  different  groups  varied  a  great
deal  then  calorie  adequacy  inequality  within  the  household  could  be
generdted  simply  due  to  household  composition  effects.  We attempt  to
control  for  household  composition  effects  (behavioural  or  otherwise)
with  multivariate  analysis,  while  calorie  requirements  sand  therefore
calorie  adequacy)  are  based  on  Philippine  age-gender-pregnancy  status
requiresments  (FNRI,  1976).4
From  the calorie  intake  and requirement  data,  a c.alorie  adequacy
variable,  *i,  is calculated  for  the ith individual  and is used  to
construct  01 (the  average  *i  within  the household,  or household
welfare)  and  Th,  the Theil  measure  of inequality  of 0i  within
household  h. Figire  2 presents  scatter  and relief  plots  of  *i  against
*1. If  all individuals  were exactly  meeting  their  requirements,  the
plots  would  collapse  onto  the (1,1)  point.  If there  were  different
levels  of household  welfare,  but everyone  within  a household  had an
equal  value  of *i  (-41),  the  plots  would represent  straight  lines at
a 45 degree  angle  to the *1 axis.
4  A second  set  of calorie  requirements  was created  by calculating
basal  metabolic  rates  for each  individual  by age,  gender,
reproductive  status  and  body weight (see  WHO 1985).  The correlation
coefficient  between  the first  and second  sets  is high (0.878)  and
correspondingly  the  empirical  results  below  differ  little  between
sets  one and  two.  A third set  of estimates  based  on  age-gender-
pregnancy  status-body  weight-activity  pattern  requirements  could  not
be  constructed  because  of incomplete  information  on  child  activity
patterirs.11
Figure  2:  ' ats  of  individual  calorie  adequacy  (¢i) against
average  calorie  adequacy  within  the  household  (  )
2.  0,-
1.  9
1.0  0.+.  . . .0  z.  +  . -
1.7  1
1.6  +++  4
+  -J+ 4 +
4 +  ~+  4





0.  3  +
0.  2 
0.0  __________________________







1  ~2880 points  plotted
(b)4  in  relief12
Points in quadrant  4  (2) represent  individuals  with ca:orie
adequacies greater  (lower) than the mean individual  adequacy  of
0.877, despite their location  in households  with mean calorie
adequacies  lower  (greater) than 0.877.  Forty-four percent of Figure  2
individuals  from quadrant  2 are female  with an average age of 9.36,
while in quadrant  4 the corresponding  figures are 51% and 31.93
years.
3.1.3  The dependent  variable
The dispersion  of Xi within  household  h is captured by Th(0i), the
Theil measure of inequality  (Kanbur 1984).5 The Theil measure is
given  as:
nh
Th(Oi)=  i  (1/nh)[tOi/jl).ln(ii/0j)].
For nh=1  Oi= 01  and Th-O; but for n >  1, Th is scale  (O1)
independent.6 None of the 448 households  have  nh=1. The dependent
variable  is logged as lnTh since  (i} u is truncated  below -xf, and
(ii)  most  of the values  of Th occur in a narrow  band between  0.001
and 0.11 - logging the values  expands the dispersion  along the
5  The analysis  presented  below  is little changed  if we replace the
Theil measure  with another measure  of inequality  such as the log
variance.
6  The Theil index is homogeneous  of degree  zero with  respect to
scale  (see Kanbur 1984).13
vertical  axis. For our sample, Figure  3 plots Th and lnTh against
3.1.4  Right  hand  side  variables
Apart  from $1' our measure  of household  well-being,  we include a
standard  set of explanatory  variables  (the reduced form equivalence
of  the competing  underlying  structural  models, e.g.  joint welfare  or
bargaining,  is well  known  [Senauer et. al. 1988, Folbre 19861). The
explanatory  variables  include household  demographics  and the
opportunity  costs of time  of the males and females in the household
who are of working age.8 Definitions  and descriptive  statistics  of
these variables  are presented  in Appendix  1.
3.2 In search of the Inverse-U
Rather  than examine a whole array  of non-nested  functional  forms that
permit  a non-constant  8Th/80l across  *1 values, we run a grid search
for the spline cutoffs that minimise  the  residual sum of squares.  The
spline technique  fits linear  segments  to the data, with  the data
determining  the location  of the cut-offs  along the *1  axis, and is
7  In response to the usual worries  about the mean  as a measure of
central  tendency sensitive  to extreme  values, these figures were
repeated  for the median  of *i  within  each household  with the plots
being very  similar in both  scale and pattern.
8  The opportunity  cost of time  is represented  as predicted  wage
rate, calculated  with the appropriate  reservation-wage  selectivity
correction  (Haddad 1987).14
Figure  3:  Scatterplots  of  the  Theil  index  per  household  against
average  calorie  adequacy  within  the  household
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generally regarded as less restrictive than functional forms that
involve a transformation of 01.9
3.2.1 Linear spline analysis
Table 1 reports the estimated OLS coefficients on *l  in each of three
line segments as significantly different from zero - and positive,
negative, and negative respectively with the cutoffs at  - 0.68 and
0.74.10 The corresponding elasticities at 01-0.5, 0.7,
and 1.0 are 1.780 (=3.599*0.5), -5.81 (--8.304*0.7),  and -0.53
(=-0.53*1.0).  Figure 4, which plots the results in Table 1, seems to
indicate that we have found an inverse U between Th(oi)  and 01
although the first and third segments are only significantly
different from zero at the 7% and 9% levels respectively. The other
explanatory variables have estimated coefficients as expected:
controlling for 01, the demographic variables all increase
inequality, with the preschooler and child variablLs having the
largest effects - with no significant differences across gender. The
adult male and female opportunity cost of time variables reduce
inequality to similar extents although their estimated coefficients
are barely larger than their estimated standard errors.
9  The  only  restrictions  imposed  on  the  fitted  curve  are  (i)  the line
segments  are linear and (ii)  consecutive  segments  meet at the
boundaries.  Clearly the importance of the former restriction
diminishes  as  the  number  of  segments  increases  (the  segments  are  only
linear  in  lnTh,  01  space  anyway)  and  the  importance  of  the second
restriction  can  be  tested  against a model where the segments are
disconnected  (Stewart  and Wallis 1987).
10  A  crude  grid  search over the entire O1  space was conducted
followed by a fine grid search in the neighbourhood of the first-
stage minimum. The corresponding grid search for the second set of 0i
estimates produced cutoffs of 0.69, 0.79 and similiar slope
coefficient estimates.16
Table  1:  Non-linearities  in  the  relationship  between  calorie  adequacy
inequality  (lnTh)  and  mean  calorie  adequacy  within  the
household  (*,):  grid  search  for  optimal  selection  of  the  two
middle  spline  segments.
variable  estimated  estimated
coefficient  standard  t-stat  significance
(OLS)  error  level
Constant  -4.864  0.595  -8.173  0.000
Zi  3.599  1.936  1.859  0.064
Z2  -8.304  3.153  -2.634  0.009
Z3  -0.533  0.319  -1.671  0.096
PWAGEl  -0.010  0.006  -1.725  0.085
PWAGE2  -0.016  0.015  -1.038  0.300
F15  0.367  0.078  4.707  0.000
s15  0.175  0.073  2.380  0.018
F614  0.132  0.041  3.186  0.002
M614  0.166  0.042  3.910  0.000
FGE1S  0.082  0.069  1.187  0.236
MGE15  0.120  0.058  2.070  0.039




1.  linLe  segmentl-0.395  and  line  segment4-1.61,  the  extremes  of
the  01 distribution.
2. the  regression  with  line  segment2-0.68  and  line
segment3-0.74  is the  optimal  spline  (see above):
where,
Z- - 0  if  01  It  0.395
2l - 01-0.395  if 4q  ge  0.395  and  lt 0.68
Z- - 0.68-0.395  if *1  ge  0.68
Z2 - 0  if °1 lt  0.68
Z2  0  ¢1-0.68  if °1  ge  0.68  and  lt  0.74
Z2  - 0.74-0.68  if  *l  ge  0.74
Z3 - 0  if  Q 1 lt  0.74
Z3 - 01-0.74  if 01  ge  0.74  and  lt  1.61
Z3  1.61-0.74  if  Ol  ge  1.61
3.  The  households  split  into  three  groups  of  49,  50,  and  349
(sums to 448).
(d:\poverty\iii\table.2117
Figure  4:  Spline  fit  of  in  (Theil)  against  1
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3.2.2 Diagnostics on residuals
The results above are a first iteration awaiting diagnostic tests on
the residuals. Does it matter from a statistical  viewpoint that vi
forms the basis of the dependent variable Th and  O1?  Is the variance
of the disturbance term positively related to household size  (as  is
suggested by the above estimated coefficients on the household
demographic variables)? How sensitive are the results to outliers in
the (0.68, 0.74) interval for *1? Finally, how restrictive is the
spline technique's insistence on line segments being connected?
- simulteneity  bias
The potential for simulteneity bias is obvious as cov(lnTh(Oi),
*1 00i)l  is non-zero, but its empirical  importance remains to be seen.
Predictably,  implementation  of  a  standard  Hausman  (1978)  test  on  the
linear  spline  model  rejected  the  null  hypothesis  of  no  simulteneity
bias  (t  - 2.107) at 5% (but  not at 1%). The three slope coefficient
estimates over the range of 01 are inconsistent. Attempts to replace
*1 with predicted  111,  floundered due to the reduced range in 
0lhat
(0.636,  1.197) compared to that for 01 (0.395,  1.610) - indicative of
an important efficiency/consistency tradeoff. Apart from our implicit
appeals to mean square error, our continued reliance on ordinary
least squares is also based on the fact that we are more interested
in the sign of the slope coefficients (is  there an inverse-U?) rather
11  The instrument set consisted of spouse and wife heights and
weights, price paid for corn and rice, and total area cultivated by
household. The Hausman test result  was robust to variation in the
instrument set.19
than the exact magnitude of the coefficients (how  flat is the
inverse-U?).
- heteroscedasticity
Since a household of two can, in principle, exhibit the same range of
lnTh(Oi) values as a household of ten, it seems reasonable to assume
homoscedasticity of the disturbance with respect to household size.
Nevertheless, the conditions under which the Theil measure is
independent of household size are restrictive
12 and we test for
heteroscedasticity with a White test  (Maddala  1988) on the residuals
of the linear spline function. The White test rejects the null
hypothesis of homoscedasticity with respect to household size.
13
weighted  least squares estimates presented in Table 2 change little
from the OLS estimates in Table 1.
- outliers
The outliers in Figure 3 raise the question of the sensitivity of our
results to extreme values of lnTh(Oi).  Table 3 presents WLS residuals
with absolute value  greater than 3, together with their predicted
WLS residuals and studentised  WLS residuals (see  Table 3 for
12  The impact on a household's  Theil measure, of the introduction of
a new member, depends on the redistribution that takes palce
afterwards. If *,  remains unchanged, then Th falls if the newcomer
draws from initially better off members. If *  is allowed to change
there are even more possibilities.
13  OLSresid
2 - 4.904 -1.141*numhh  +  0.0691*numhh
2
(t)  (7.56)  (6.55)
Heteroscedasticity does not affect the spline grid search
which is based on OLS estimates [i.e.  RSS=E (Th-XPhat)
2].
h20
Table 2: Non-linearities in the relationship  between calorie adequacy
inequality (lnTh)  and mean calorie adequacy within the
household  (1):  WLS spline  estimates
variable  estimated  estimated
coefficient  standard  t-stat  significance
(WLS)  error  level
weighting factor -4.796  0.497  -9.649  0.000
Zi  3.349  1.600  2.093  0.037
Z2  -8.142  2.413  -3.374  0.001
Z3  -0.448  0.309  -1.419  0.148
PWAGE1  -0.008  0.005  -1.816  0.070
PWAGE2  0.001  0.013  0.081  0.935
F15  0.169  0.067  2.539  0.011
M15  0.037  0.061  0.613  0.541
F614  0.077  0.037  2.092  0.037
M614  0.095  0.036  2.615  0.009
FGE15  0.119  0.051  2.340  0.020
MGE15  0.142  0.046  3.110  0.002
Adjusted R Square - 0.96089
F  - 918.14447
n - 448
Note:  weighted least squares regression use weights
- [(4.904-1.141*  mhh+.0691*numhhsq) 1/2]
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Table  3: WLS residuals outlier analysis
hhid  wlares  predicted  studentised  phil  lnTh  Th
276  -3.03  -3.32  -2.83  .75  -5.42  0.00442
357  -3.04  -3.06  -2.72  .78  -9.40  0.00008
356  3.19  3.31  2.90  1.02  -2.37  0.09340
288  -3.20  -3.34  -2.92  .98  -5.27  0.00514
311  -3.37  -3.49  -3.07  1.12  -5.82  0.00296
286  -3.60  -3.82  -3.32  .59  -5.57  0.00381
453  -3.76  -4.03  -3.49  .88  -5.67  0.00345
424  -4.25  -4.42  -3.90  .81  -6.31  0.00181
key:
hhid  - household  id
wlsres  - weighted least squares residuals
pLedicted  - predicted weighted lea_' squares residuals
t-lnTh-pred(lnTh)  when the household's
observation  is  dropped]
studentised  - studentised  weighted  least squares residuals
[-predicted  wlsres/standard  error]
phi 1 - 1  for  each  household
lnTh  - ln of the Theil index for each household
Th  - the Theil index for each household
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definitions). While the residuals are little changed in their
predicted and studentised forms, 7 out of the 8 residuals are
negative, implying that the third fitted segment  may be being
disproportionately dragged down by some extremely low values of Th in
the *l > 0.78  range, but this does little if anything to overstate
the inverse-U.  In addition, the six observations for which Th(i:  >
0.1, were arbitrarily changed to Th( 4 i) - 0.1, with a reanalysis
showing the numbers in Tables 1 and 2 changing little, and the
conclusions changing not at all.
- testing line  segment  continuity
A simple F-test can be constructed testing the null hypothesis of
continuous line segments [e.g.  al +  1{  01) - a2; for segments 1 and
21. Performing a joint test across the two kinks (number  of
restrictions - 2) we reject the null hypothesis (Ftest  - 8.813 >
F.0 1
2,4 18 - 4.61) of continuity. Despite this rejection (and remember
the alternative hypothesis constitutes free-fitted segments within
each of the three °1 intervals) and the fact that coefficients on @1
within each segment are of reduced significance, they do display the
same signs, and similar magnitudes to their spline counterparts.
Indeed, as the results in Table 4 demonstrate, the spline technique
actually understates the inverse U-shape.
4.  Conclusions: Related Studies  and  Further Research
rollowing on from various theoretical possibilities of an intra-
household Kuznets curve, we have conducted an empirical investigation
for a-particular dataset. The results, however tentative, provide23
Table  4:  Line  continuity  results
spline  °  S  .68  .68  <  ¢1  S  .74  *1  >  .74
Variable  a  t  a  t  B  t  t
conatant  -4.864  -8.17  -6.964  -4.62  3.353  0.66  -3.755  -6.32
PHIl  - - 3.611  1.79  -11.551  -1.61  -0.515  -1.48
Zi  3.599  1.86  - - - - - -
Z2  -8.304  -2.63  - - - - - -
Z3  -0.533  -1.67  - - - - - -
F15  0.367  4.71  0.586  2.68  0.008  0.04  0.396  4.35
Mis  0.175  2.38  0.618  2.35  0.304  1.58  0.134  1.60
F614  0.132  3.19  0.143  1.23  0.087  1.03  0.138  2.74
M614  0.166  3.91  0.131  1.19  0.142  1.34  0.154  3.06
FGE1S  0.082  1.19  0.076  0.39  0.187  1.22  0.092  1.08
MGE15  0.120  2.07  0.357  2.23  0.244  1.55  0.081  1.19
PWAGE1  -0.010  -1.73  -0.053  -2.61  -0.013  -0.71  -0.008  -1.20
PWAGE2  -0.016  -1.04  0.047  1.23  0.027  0.66  -0.028  -1.57
Adj.  R  Sq.  0.168  0.265  0  837  0.140
RSS  371.723  24.697  22.269  310.762
n  448  49  50  349
(d:\poverty\iii\Table.5]24
preliminary support for a Kuznets curve at the very micro level of
the household.
While we are unaware of any previous empirical studies that have
tackled this question directly, we should mention here that the
results of a number of studies can be interpreted within our
framework.  For rural Philippines, Senauer et. al. (1988)  find that
"the estimated wage rate of the wife and mother has a aiqnificant
positive impact on the relative calorie allocation of both herself
and her children and a negative effect on the husband's allocation",
but their sample is too small to permit scale disaggregation.
Folbre's (193V)  analysis of the Philippine Laguna  data shows that
inequality of,  in this case, work effort, was much less pronounced in
wealthier families, although no comment is made about households on
the lowest part of the wealth distribution.
Employing a similar technique to Senauer et. al., Haddad (1987)  used
the data set employed in this paper to report ti)  that the calorie
allocation of preschoolers relative to the household as a whole
exhibited a U-shape across income quintiles, and (ii)  mothers
education and reported childcare time  (instrumentedi  exerted the most
positive and significant effects on relative preschooler calorie
allocation within the middle income quintiles. These results are
consistent with the inverted U-shape hypothesis  we  test  here:  - in
the middle income ranges where increases in household income provide
little comfort for the preschooler, non-monetary influences (such  as
mothers' education and time spent with child) become more important
determinants of preschooler calorie allocation.25
If the results  reported have  are  contismd  with  other  dataets,  then
there  appear  to be significant  policy  mpLiLcations  for a atrategy of
reaching  disadvantaged  individuals  through  favouring  disadvantaged
households.  It would appear that it is not siLply  enough  to  increase
the  total  resources  of  a  houaehold  since,  pocticula  rly for  poor
households,  the  accompanying  increase  in  inequality  may  well
undermine the beneficial  effects  on  the poorest  Lndividuals  of  the
total resource  increase.  These effects should  be  taken into account
ln the  design  of  supplementary  feeding  programs,  for  *xanple,  and
research  is  now  undarway  on  this  important  topic  (see  Haddad  and
Kanbur,  1990b).26
Appendix  1:  Variable  definitions  and  deacriptives
variable  mean std  dev  minimum maximum  n  definition
label
TLNH  .03  .02  .001  .15  448  Theil(T)  per  hh(ln)
LNTLNUR  -3.96  1.01  -9.40  -1.92  448  ln Theil(T)
PRNl  .89  .19  .395  1.61 448  mean  of phi
MIS  .59  .66  0.0  3.00  448  no.  of males  le 5 in hh
P1S  .52  .62  0.0  3.00  448  no.  of females  le 5 in  hh
1614  1.23  1.13  0.0  5.00  448  no. of males 5.01-14.99 yrs
F614  1.21  1.12  0.0  6.00  448  no.  of females  5.01-14.99  yrs
MGE1S  1.49  .90  0.0  6.00  448  no. of males ge 15 yrs
FGE15  1.39  .72  0.0  5.00 448  no.  of females  ge 15  yrs
PWAGE1  26.23  8.67  18.09  75.66 448  predicted  daily  wage,  male  boh
real pesos
PRAGE2  16.82  3.78  1.60  23.35  448  predicted  daily  wage,  spouse
real  pesos
UT1  52.95  6.28  39.00  78.50  448  weight  in kilos  of male  hoh
NT2  47.26  7.40  30.50  71.50  448  weight  in kilos  of spouse
HT1  161.18  5.86  145.30  184.00 448  height  in  cm,  male hoh
NT2  150.16  6.35  101.30  166.40  448  weight in cm, spouse
CULTAREA  2.56  3.38  0.0  25.50  448  area  cultivated,  hectares
PRICEKG  5.48  .41  3.97  6.77  448  price/kg  paid  for  rice
PCORNKG  4.26  .33  3.28  5.61  448  price/kg  paid  for  corn
NUMHH  6.43  2.43  2.00  15.00  448  number  in  hh27
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